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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
PROCEDURE AND PROPERTY
BERNARD C. GAVIT*
The materials on Procedure and Property do not include
any extended comments. It has been thought that if the im-
portant recent cases and statutes were cataloged with a brief
statement as to the decision in the case or the substance of
the statute that lawyers would have little difficulty in fitting
the cases and statutes into their present knowledge on the
subject. A good many cases, particularly in the field of Pro-
cedure, have been included which decide nothing new but
which involve points which appear to be rather frequently
overlooked or about which there appears to be some misap-
prehension because of the frequency with which the questions
are presented for decision.
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT
The 1943 Revision, Rules of the Supreme Court, will be
found published in the front of Vol. 220, Ind.; in the front of
Vol. 112, Ind. App.; and also in the supplement to Vol. I,
Burns Stat. Pamphlet copies may be secured from the Clerk
of the Supreme Court.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION; RES JUDICATA
General American Life Ins. Co. v. Carter 222 Ind. 557, 54
N.E. (2d) 944 (1944), holds that a foreign insurance cor-
poration. which qualifies in this state and appoints an agent
for the service of process under the applicable statute only
consents to jurisdiction as to contracts made in this state, and
therefore there is no jurisdiction where the plaintiff is a non-
resident and the policy was not delivered in this state.
Sherburne v. Miami Coal Co. 109 Ind. App. 587, 37 N.E.
(2d) 12 (1941), holds that where a Federal Court in Illinois
had appointed a receiver such receiver had constructive pos-
session of the defendant's real estate located in Indiana, and
an Indiana court may not exercise jurisdiction in rem as to
the property.
Note: On the problem of concurrent jurisdiction in per-
sonam and injunction against litigation in another jurisdiction
* Dean, Indiana University Law School.
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see, Baltimore & 0. R. v. Kepner (1941) 314 U.S. 44, (Actions
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. This case is
consistent with McConnell v. Thomson (1937) 213 Ind. 16, 8
N.E. (2d) 986, 11 N.E. (2d) 183, 113 A.L.R. 1429, but it is
inconsistent with Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. (1933)
204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446). See also Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
State ex rel. Shepherd v. Nichols, Judge 219 Ind. 89, 36.
N.E. (2d) 931 (1941), holds that a circuit court during vaca-
tion has power to issue a restraining order without notice
against a party to a divorce action.
Simmons, et al. v. Woodward, et al. 217 Ind. 15, 26 N.E.
(2d) 37 (1940), holds that a judgment against a public of-
ficer is res judicata in a subsequent action brought by a tax-
payer involving the same subject.
Castor v. Gary Lumber Co. 220 Ind. 260, 41 N.E. (2d)
945 (1942), holds that a judgment in an action to foreclose
a mortgage, where al defendant filed a cross-complaint asking
for the enforcement of a contract to remove certain property,
and recovered no judgment for the balance of the purchase
price of the property involved, is res judicata as to that claim,
because it might have been asserted.
Hine et al v. Wright et al 110 Ind. App. 385, 36 N.E. (2d)
972 (1941), holds that one not a formal party may be fore-
closed by a judgment if he actually participates in the litiga-
tion, or was represented, but the assertion by another of
representation does not conclude the matter. (There is a due
process question in such cases, i.e., was there fair representa-
tion? See, Hansberry v. Lee 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
Padol v. Home Bank & Trust Co. 108 Ind. App. 401, 27
N.E. (2d) 917 (1940), holds that Sec. 2-2601, Burns Stat.
(vacation of a judgment where the only notice was by pub-
lication) is applicable to an action brought under Sec. 2-1068,
Burns Stat. (excusable neglect) where the defendant was noti-
fied by publication.
(Note: Sec. 2-1068, Burns Stat. as amended in 1941 now
limits proceedings under 2-2601, Burns Stat. to one year if
an action to quiet title is involved.)
Freimann v. Gallmeier - Ind. App. - , 63 N.E. (2d)
150 (1945), holds that the holding of a trial and entry of
judgment on a legal holiday is erroneous, but under the facts
of the case not reversible error.
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Knue v. Knue 217 Ind. 319, 28 N.E. (2d) 76 (1940),
holds that a summons to be served out of the state can only
be issued during term time by order of court (as in the case
of publication) and that such a summons issued by the clerk
during term does not constitute the commencement of an
action against a non-resident.
(Quaere: Is this a fair interpretation of the pertinent
statute? The statute makes no such requirement.)
Donnelly v. Thorne 114 Ind. App. 468, 51 N.E. (2d) 873
(1943), holds that by an answer in abatement a non-resident
defendant may dispute the correctness of a sheriff's return
reciting service at a last and usual place of residence; and
that participation in the taking of a deposition on the answer
is not a general appearance.
(See Note on this case, 19 Ind. L. J. 279).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
See note under Padol v. Home Bank & T. Co., above.
Sec. 2-621, Burns Stat. (Ch. 8, Sec. 1, Acts 1943, p. 17)
provides a five year limitation for the foreclosure of special
assessment liens, and in any event 15 years from their ap-
proval if payable in instalments.
Sec. 2-626, Burns Stat. (Ch. 141, Sec. 1, Acts 1941, p.
428) undertakes to cure, except as to "vested rights" or per-
sons under disability all defects in title to real estate after
35 years.
Sec. 2-627, Burns Stat. (Ch. 116, Sec. 1, Acts 1941, p.
328) limits actions for malpractice, in contract or tort, to 2
years.
Graf v. City Transit Co. 220 Ind. 249, 41 N.E. (2d) 941
(1942), holds (overruling 180 Ind. 386) that the husband's
claim for loss of services, etc. arising gut of wrongful injury
to his wife is, for property damage and not for personal in-
jury and governed by the 6 year and not the 2 year statute of
limitations.
Deep Vein Coal Co. v. Dowdle 218 Ind. 495, 33 N.E. (2d)
981 (1941), holds that if a new defendant is substituted the
action, as against the statute of limitations, is commenced as
of the date of the substitution.
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PLEADING
Rule 1-2.
Ratcliff et al v. Ratcliff et al 219 Ind. 429, 39 N.E. (2d)
435 (1942), states that the purpose of Rule 1-2 is to facilitate
the answer required by Rule 1-3 and to narrow the issues.
Answer in Abatement
Cushman Motor Delivery Co. et al. v. McCabe, Admr.
219 Ind. 156, (1941). This case repeats and follows the es-
tablished rules as to the sufficiency of an answer in abate-
ment (it must show as against every possible exception that
it is well taken; and on demurrer the court may not look be-
yond the plea).
Donnelly v. Thorne 114 Ind. App. 468, 51 N.E. (2d) 873
(1943), holds that a challenge as to the factual correctness
of a sheriff's return is correctly made by answer in abate-
ment rather than by motion to quash.
(See Note on this case, 19 Ind. L. J. 279).
Ritter v. Ritter 219 Ind. 487, 38 N.E. (2d) 997 (1942),
holds that where incapacity appears on the face of the com-
plaint the question may not be raised by answer in abate-
ment, but only by demurrer.
Griffith, Exec. et al v. Thrall, Admr. et al 109 Ind. App.
141, 29 N.E. (2) 345 (1940). A husband brought an action
to contest his wife's will because of unsoundness of mind and
the verdict was against the will. Apparently the marriage
and execution of the will occurred at about the same time. It
was argued that the finding of insanity forced the conclusion
that the plaintiff's marriage was invalid, and therefore he
was not the testatrix's heir. Held, the defendants had not
challenged the right or capacity of the plaintiff by special
answer and therefore had waived the question. (But, quaere?
It certainly was not a question of capacity; the plaintiff nec-
essarily alleged that he was the surviving husband and heir.
Why was not the fact in issue?)
Jones v. Evanoff 114 Ind. App. 318, 52 N.E. (2d) 359
(1944), holds that the failure of a landlord to give a tenant
the statutory notice to quit goes to the prematurity of an
action and the question is properly raised by an answer in
abatement.
Joinder of Actions.
Sec. 2-304, 2-305, Burns Stat. (Ch. 68, Sec. 1, Acts 1937,
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p. 33; Ch. 227, Sec. 1, Acts 1943, p. 662) permit the joinder
of actions for personal injury and property damage arising
out of the same accident in the same or separate paragraphs
of complaint.
Long v. Archer 221 Ind. 186, 46 N.E. (2d) 818 (1942),
holds that a plaintiff may proceed on inconsistent theories if
they are separately stated, and that he cannot be required to
elect between them on the trial. Semble, if they are alleged
in one paragraph of pleading and no attack on the pleading is
made on that ground.
Parties.
Demurrers and Motions; Form of Allegations.
Oliver v. Coffman 112 Ind. App. 507, 45 N.E. (2d) 351
(1942). In this case the court undertakes to define "legal
conclusions" and "ultimate facts", and to define the functions
of a motion to strike out and to make more specific.
State ex rel. Dept. of Financial Institutions v. Hardy
218 Ind. 79, 30 N.E. (2d) 974 (1941), holds that an allegation
that one is the owner of property is an ultimate fact; that a
ruling sustaining a demurrer may be sustained on appeal on
grounds not assigned in the demurrer; that a complaint an-
ticipating a defense and not avoiding it is demurrable.
Ederer v. Froberg - Ind. App. -, 59 N.E. (2d)
595 (1945), holds tha a motion to strike out an entire plead-
ing cannot be used to serve the function of a demurrer and
thus deprive a party of his privilege to amend.
City of Evansville v. Maddox 217 Ind. 39, 25 N.E. (2d)
321 (1940), holds that a complaint alleging facts "and/or" is
subject to a motion to make more specific but is not subject
to a demurrer for insufficient facts if it states a claim on
either alternative.
State ex rel Cedar Creek School Township v. Curtin 217
Ind. 190, 26 N.E. (2d) 909 (1940), holds that a complaint is
sufficient against demurrer if the plaintiff is entitled to any
relief other than that prayed for (i.e., equitable rather than
mandate.)
Long v. Archer 221 Ind. 186, 46 N.E. (2d) 818 (1942),
holds that prior to the adoption of Rule 1-6 a demurrer ad-
dressed generally to a complaint containing two pleading
paragraphs is properly overruled if either paragraph is good.
(Under Rule 1-6 the demurrer must be regarded as addressed
to them separately.)
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State ex rel. City of Loogootee v. Larkin et at 218 Ind.
382, 33 N.E. (2d) 112 (1941), holds that a demurrer for in-
sufficient facts raises the question of the real party in inter-
est. (i.e. the complaint shows the right in question to be in
X and not in the plaintiff.)
Change of Ruling.
Dick et al v. Glenn et at 218 Ind. 282, 32 N.E. (2d) 698
(1941), holds that conclusions of law inconsistent with a
prior ruling on demurrer are not improper or invalid on that
ground, as the trial judge may change his mind during the
progress of the trial.
Answers.
Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc. 221 Ind. 47, 46 N.E. (2d)
243 (1942), holds that a general denial filed in violation of
Rule 1-3 entitles the plaintiff to judgment on the pleadings.
(For a discussion of Rule 1-3 see Gavit, Indiana Pleading
and Practice (1941) Sec. 21, 23.)
Lindley v. Sink 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E. (2d) 456 (1940),
holds that in an action for wrongful death the plaintiff need
not negative contributory negligence, as it is an affirmative
defense. Holds further that the negligence of one of several
beneficiaries is no defense.
Hoesel v. Cain; Kahler v. Cain 222 Ind. 330, 53 N.E. (2d)
769 (1944), holds that contributory negligence is no defense
to an action under the guest statute.
Sec. 2-305, Burns, Stat. Supp. (Ch. 227, Sec. 1, Acts
1943, p. 662) provides that if a plaintiff joins actions for
personal injury and property damage arising out of the same
accident the burden of proof as to the contributory negligence
is on the defendant as to both claims.
Ayres v. Lucas - Ind. App. - , 63 N.E. (2d) 204
(1945), holds (following a long established rule) that a de-
fendant may plead in separate paragraphs of, his answer in-
consistent defenses and that on the trial they may not be used
as admissions against interest.
Universat Credit Co. v. Collier 108 Ind. App. 685, 31 N.E.
(2d) 646 (1940), holds that until default a conditional sales
vendee is the real party in interest to bring an action for in-
jury to the property; after default both the vendee and yen-
19461
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dor are proper parties, and therefore the vendor may in-
tervene in an action brought by the vendee and assert his
claim by cross-complaint.
Ritter v. Ritter et al 219 Ind. 487, 38 N.E. (2d) 997
(1942), holds that one adjudged insane, and for whom a
guardian has been appointed, may nevertheless maintain an
action challenging the adjudication and appointment on the
ground of fraud.
Hoesel v. Cain; Kahler v. Cain 222 Ind. 330, 53 N.E. (2d)
769 (1944), holds that a plaintiff may join as defendants the
driver of a guest car and one alleged to have negligently
caused the accident, as they are joint tort-feasors.
Barnard v. Kruzan 221 Ind. 208, 46 N.E. (2d) 238
(1942), holds that a petition to intervene need not be veri-
fied, and that as against a motion to strike it out its allega-
tions must be accepted as true, unless they are false on their
face.
Holds that in a class representation suit the court is
bound to insure a fair and honest representation, and there-
fore should consider on its merits a petition to intervene,
filed by a member of the class, which raises such an issue.
Board of Commissioners of Vanderburg Co. v. Sanders
218 Ind. 43, 30 N.E. (2d) 713, 131 A. L. R. 1048 (1940),
sustains a class suit by one of several thousand claimants to
recover illegal fees paid to a county.
Amendment.
Inter-State Motor Freight System v. Morgan 113 Ind.
App. 374, 47 N.E. (2d) 326 (1943), holds that where the
trial court permits a defendant to file an additional paragraph
of answer the ruling will not be reversed on appeal except for
a "clear abuse of discretion".
Motion In Arrest of Judgment.
McDaniels v. McDaniels - Ind. App. -, 62 N.E.
(2d) 876 (1945), holds that a motion in arrest of judgment
filed after judgment has been rendered presents no question.
Cassell et al v. Cochran 114 Ind. App. 115, 51 N.E. (2d)
21 (1943), holds that if a defendant does not question the
sufficiency of the complaint by demurrer a motion in arrest
of judgment raises no question, and the motion in arrest, filed
prior to a motion for a new trial, waives the latter; that the
waiver by failure to demurrer is only as to the sufficiency of
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the pleading and on a motion for a new trial the defendant
may question the right to recover on the merits and the evi-
dence.
SPECIAL ACTIONS
An act of 1941 §3-623, et seq. (Burns Stat. Supp.)
is a complete revision of the law of adoption and illegitimate
children.
These statutes have been amended by Acts 1945, Ch. 69,
p. 154, Ch. 95, p. 212, Ch. 356, p. 1724.
Divorce.
Smith v. Smith 217 Ind. 55, 26 N.E. (2d) 41 (1940),
holds that a final decree in a divorce case that the plaintiff
recover from the defendant $75 as an attorney's fee "for the
use of her counsel" gave the attorney no interest in the judg-
ment, the latter phrase being surplusage; the decree could only
be enforced in the name of the plaintiff.
(Sec. 3-1220, Burns, Stat. Supp.; Ch. 18, Sec. 1, Acts
1943, p. 37, apparently is intended to give the attorney a
right to the payment, but the statute is not free from am-
biguity.)
Berghean v. Berghean 113 Ind. App. 412, 48 N.E. (2d)
1001 (1943), holds that the residence witness requirement as
to "householder" means "master or head", and that two mar-
ried women who testified did not satisfy the requirement
where their evidence simply was that they were married and
kept house for their husbands.
Habeas Corpus.
State ex rel. Bevington v. Myers 220 Ind. 149, 41 N.E.
(2d) 353 (1941), holds that the criminal court in Marion
County may not entertain jurisdiction of an action for habeas
corpus although the petitioner was convicted in that court
where he is confined in the State Prison, as the action must
be brought in a court of the county in which he is being re-
strained.
(Note, that the Supreme Court also holds that the La-
Porte County courts have no jurisdiction and the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction. Thus unless the defendant is con-
victed in the county in which he is imprisoned habeas corpus
is an academic remedy. Clearly the matter should receive
legislative attention.)
1946]
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Dowd, Warden v. Anderson 220 Ind. 6, 40 N.E. (2d)
658 (1941), holds that a court in LaPorte County has no
jurisdiction by habeas corpus to review a conviction entered
by the Crawford Circuit Court.
Wood v. Dowd, Warden 221 Ind. 702, 51 N.E. (2d) 356
(1943), holds that a constitutional question which might have
been raised on the original trial may not be raised in an action
for habeas corpus.
(The Federal Rule is to the contrary. See, Gavit, Indiana
Pleading and Practice, Sec. 236 (o). The latest case on the
subject is Hawk v. Olson 66 S. Ct. 116 (1945). The result is
that in Indiana the Federal Courts should get all of the habeas
corpus business.)
Receivers.
Ratcliff v. Ratcliff 219, Ind. 429, 39 N.E. (2d) 435
(1942), holds that in an action to set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance a receiver may be appointed.
Mandate and Prohibition.
State ex rel Gillette v. Niblack, Judge 222 Ind. 290, 53
N.E. (2d) 542 (1944), holds that the Criminal Court of Mar-
ion County, because it has appellate jurisdiction over the
Municipal Court in criminal matters, has power to mandate
or prohibit that court and the Supreme Court has no juris-
diction where the matter in question involves action relating
to an appeal to the Criminal Court.
Note: See also the cases on Mandate, Prohibition and
Certiorari, under Jurisdiction of Supreme and Appellate
Courts. These cases are pertinent if the powers of a trial
court over an inferior court or administrative agency within
its territorial jurisdiction are involved.
TRIAL PRACTICE
Special Judges and Change of Venue.
Ploughe v. Indianapolis Railways, Inc. 222 Ind. 125, 51
N.E. (2d) 626 (1943), holds Rule 1-9 to be constitutional.
State ex rel. Mayer v. Youngblood 221 Ind. 408, 48 N.E.
(2d) 55 (1942), holds that the judge who presided at the trial
should rule on a writ of error coram nobis, if he is available.
State ex rel. Win. H. Block Co. v. Superior Ct. of Marion
Co. 221 Ind. 228, 47 N.E. (2d) 139 (1942), holds that where
[Vol. 21
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the regula" judge sustained a motion for a new trial his suc-
cessor has no jurisdiction to reconsider the ruling.
State ex rel. Hodshire v. Bingham, Judge 218 Ind. 490,
33 N.E. (2d) 771, 134 A. L. R. 1126 (1941), holds that under
Rule 1-9, a judge pro tem whose term has expired may rule
on a motion for a new trial and file a bill of exceptions.
State ex rel. Uservo, Inc. v. Circuit Court of Huntington
Co. 217 Ind. 297, 27 N.E. (2d) 79 (1940), holds that where a
special judge is appointed in a contempt proceeding he has
jurisdiction to certify bills of exceptions, etc., but after final
disposition of the contempt.proceedings he has no jurisdiction
of a petition to modify the original decree, and further con-
tempt proceedings.
State ex rel. Emmert v. Gentry - Ind. - , 62 N.E.
(2d) 860 (1945), holds that on a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis, if the judge who tried the case is not available,
the state is entitled to a change of venue from the regular
judge.
State ex rel. Kiser, Cohn & Shumaker, Inc. v. Sammons
et al- Ind. -, 57 N.E. (2d) 587 (1944), holds that a
special judge may not act judicially (i.e., grant a motion for
a change of venue) in his office in another county; that he
may not in any event act on such a motion in the absence of
notice to the other parties.
(On the latter point the case is extremely significant,
and may well be construed to repudiate the rule that once a
party has appeared he has constructive notice of all further
proceedings. The court suggests that the trial courts may well
adopt a general rule requiring notice of motions, demurrers,
etc.)
State ex rel. Harlan v. Municipal Court of Marion Co.
et al 221 Ind. 12, 46 N.E. (2d) 198 (1942), holds that under
Rule 1-9 a judge pro tem must rule on a motion for a new
trial, and that Sec. 2-2102 Burns Stat. (requiring the appoint-
ment of a special judge after a matter had been under advise-
ment more than 90 days) is probably unconstitutional, and in
any event it is superseded by Rule 1-9.
Holds that a court 'should not rule on a motion in the
absence of all parties, or until after notice.
General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Carter 222 Ind. 557, 54 NE.
(2d) 944 (1944), holds that a defendant may take a change
of venue while an answer in abatement is still pending, and
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in so doing he does not appear and waive the matter in abate-
ment.
State ex rel. Parker v. Vosloh, Judge 222 Ind. 518, 54
N.E. (2d) 650 (1943), holds that where the probate judge is
related to a beneficiary of the estate he is disqualified because
of interest and must appoint a special judge.
State ex rel Karsch v. Eby, Judge 218 Ind. 431, 33 N.E.
(2d) 336 (1941), holds that where one of several defendants
vacated as to him a default judgment under Sec. 2-2601 Burns
Stat. and the venue of the action was changed to an adjoining
county the second court acquired jurisdiction of the entire case
and could act upon a similar petition to vacate filed by an-
other defendant.
Hoffman v. Hoffman et al (two cases) - Ind. App.
- , 57 N.E. (2d) 591, 58 N.E. (2d) 201 (1944), holds that
after a change of venue had been taken to an adjoining
county an attorney of record had presumptive authority to
agree to a transfer back to the original court, even although
the case had already been tried but not finally disposed of.
Ch. 9, Sec. 1, Acts 1939, p. 16, provides that actions un-
der the non-resident motorist statutes may be filed in the
county of the residence of the plaintiff or in the county where
the accident occurred.
Ch. 60, Sec. 6, Acts 1939, p. 407, provides that actions
against a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in
Indiana may be begun in any county in the State.
Sec. 2-1430, Burns Stat., on change of venue and certifi-
cation of a panel by the Supreme Court, is amended by CL
235, Acts 1945, p. 1082. (The amendment seems to be designed
to exclude the inferior courts from the general language of
the statute.)
Introduction of Evidence; Burden of Proof.
Schreiber v. Rickert et al 114 Ind. App. 55, 50 N.E. (2d)
879 (1943), holds that a stipulation as to the evidence or the
facts is binding on the parties and the court until set aside
or withdrawn, and contradictory evidence is inadmissible.
Heinrich kv. Ellis 113 Ind. App. 478, 48 N.E. (2d) 96
(1943), holds that one who propounds a question to a witness
may move to strike out an answer which is not responsive,
but the adversary may not. His remedy is to move to strike
out because the evidence was inadmissible. If the evidence is
admissible the fact that it is volunteered does not harm the
[Vol. 21
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adverse party, as it could be elicited by a9 proper question.
Cobler, Admr. v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. 108 Ind. App.
641, 31 N.E. (2d) 678 (1940), holds that one who relies upon
the fact of survivorship where two persons are killed in a
common disaster has the burden of proving survivorship.
(The Uniform Act on Simultaneous Death was enacted
in Acts 1941, Ch. 49, p. 132, Sec. 6-2356 to 63, Burns Stat.
Supp. It creates certain presumptions on the subject.)
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. McCann 112 Ind.
App. 113, 40 N.E. (2d) 987 (1942). Ace. Cobler v. Pru-
dential Life immediately above.
Fardy v. Mayerstein 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E. (2d) 966.
(1942), holds that the Uniform Judicial Notice Act (Sec.
2-4804 Burns Stat.) is not self-executing, and a party relying
on judicial notice of the law of a sister state must give notice
in his pleadings "or otherwise".
Revlett v. Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. 114 Ind. App.
187, 51 N.E. (2d) 95, 500 (1943), holds that where a com-
plaint alleged facts showing that the claim arose in Kentucky
and referred to a pertinent Kentucky statute the notice re-
quired by Sec. 2-4804, Burns Stat. was given, and the plain-
tiff's complaint was sufficient as against the objection that
the Kentucky law was not pleaded in detail, the purpose of
the Judicial Notice Act being to relieve a party of pleading
and proving the law of a sister state. (The Act applies only
to the laws of the other states and territories. If the law of a
foreign country is involved the old rules prevail.)
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Van Wey et al - Ind.
,59 N.E. (2d) 721 (1945), holds that where the evidence
as to the cause of death is equally conclusive as between acci-
dent and non-accident one who has the burden of proof as
to accident cannot recover.
JURY TRIAL
Struck jury.
Pfister v. Key 218 Ind. 521, 33 N.E. (2d) 330 (1941),
holds that a struck jury is properly refused if the party de-
manding it does not tender the costs.
Time of trial.
Freimann v. Gallmeier - Ind. App. -, 63 N.E. (2d)
150 (1945), holds that a trial court has discretionary control
19461
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of its calendar, the statutes on the subject not being manda-
tory, and it was not error to set for trial a case on change of
venue within 10 days after the transcript was filed.
American Lead Corporation v. Davis 111 Ind. App. 242,
38 N.E. (2d) 281 (1941), holds that a trial court has inherent
power to consolidate actions for trial, and in this case enjoins
the separate prosecution of 150 actions for nuisance arising
out of the operation of the plaintiff's plant.
Kizer v. Hazelett 221 Ind. 575, 49 N.E. (2d) 543 (1943),
holds that in an action brought under the guest statute against
the driver of the guest car and also against a second defendant
for negligence the defendants are entitled to a separate trial
on a timely motion demanding separate trial.
Misconduct.
King v. Ransburg 111 Ind. App. 523, 39 N.E. (2d) 822
(1942), holds that where a defending insurance company is
actively represented at the trial by its agent it is not improper
for the plaintiff on his examination of the jurors to make
inquiry as to their relationship and acquaintance with him,
and to identify him as a claim agent for his company.
Helton v. Mann 111 Ind. App. 487, 40 N.E. (2d) a95
(1941), holds that while it is proper to question the jurors
as to an interest in a defending insurance company it is im-
proper to attempt to introduce evidence on the point, and. to
refer to the matter in final argument, and the situation pre-
sented in this case called for a reversal.
Riechmann v. Reasner 221 Ind. 628, 51 N.E. (2d) 10
(1943), holds that on voir dire examination the plaintiff is
entitled to inquire as to the interest of the jurors in an in-
surance company. (In this case the plaintiff stated to the
court at the beginning of the trial out of the presence of the
jury that the defendant was insured, and the fact was not
disputed.)
Instructions.
Bradford Homes Inc. v. Long 221 Ind. 309, 47 N.E. (2d)
609 (1942), holds that under Rule 1-7 no question is pre-
served as to the giving of instructions unless the record dis-
closes specific objections to them.
Keeshin Motor Express Co. v. Sowers 221 Ind. 440, 48
N.E. (2d) 459 (1942), holds that under Rule 1-7 general ob-
jections to instruction save no question; and, if the objections
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are specific additional grounds cannot be urged on appeal.
Indianapolis Railways Inc. v. Williams - Ind. App.
-, 59 N.E. (2d) 586 (1945). Ace. two cases immediately
above.
Mackey v. Niemeyer 113 Ind. App. 10, 44 N.E. (2d) 520
(1942). Acc.
Ford et al v. Cleveland 112 Ind. App. 420, 44 N.E. (2d)
244 (1942), holds that in an action to quiet title it is error
to leave to the jury the interpretation or meaning of a will.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kuhlenschmidt 218 Ind. 404,
33 N.E. (2d) 340, 135 A. L. R. 397 (1941), holds that an
instruction wihich in effect advises the jury to give no effect
to the final argument is erroneous.
Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co. of Fort Wayne v.
Parker 110 Ind. App. 1, 37 N.E. (2d) 5 (1941). This case
contains an excellent re-statement of the rules as to the power
of a court to direct a verdict in favor of a plaintiff, and ap-
pellate review on the subject.
Verdicts.
Inter State Motor Freight System v. Henry 111 Ind. App.
179, 38 N.E. (2d) 909 (1941), holds that a verdict against
two of three defendants which is silent as to the third is a
verdict in favor of the third; that verdicts in favor of a serv-
ant and against the master are inconsistent only if the master's
liability is necessarily based only on the liability of the
servant.
COURT TRIAL
Lane v. Gugsell 113 Ind. App. 676, 47 N.E. (2d) 835
(1943), holds that Rule 1-8 does not require the court to re-
oper a case on motion of a party.
Elliott v. Gardner 113 Ind. App. 47, 46 N.E. (2d) 702
(1943), holds that Rule 1-8 is applicable to a general finding.
Owen County State Bank v. Guard 217 Ind. 75, 26 N.E.
(2d) 395 (1940), holds that a conclusion that "the law is with
the plaintiff" is sufficient.
RE-OPENING TRIAL
Sanders v. Ryan et aZ 112 Ind. App. 470, 41 N.E. (2d)
833 (1942), holds that it was error for the trial court to re-
fuse the plaintiff's request tc re-open the case and introduce
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additional evidence to defeat a motion to direct a verdict by
proof of an omitted fact.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Lundquist 222 Ind. 359, 53
N.Eh (2d) 338 (1943), holds that a trial court has power to
grant a new trial on its own initiative, and for reasons beyond
those contained in the statute. (In this case the reporter's
notes were lost and the party could not therefore secure a
complete and accurate bill of exceptions.)
Lyon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 112 Ind. App. 573, 44 N.E.
(2d) 186 (1942), holds, in accord with a long line of cases,
that conclusions of law may not be challenged by a motion for
a new trial. The error must be assigned separately in the
assignment of errors.
Berning v. Scheuman 111 Ind. App. 156, 40 N.E. (2d)
1005 (1941), holds that an amended motion foil a new trial,
filed more than 30 days after decision presents no question,
and its overruling cannot be made the basis for appellate re-
view.
Cole v. Bassett's Estatd 111 Ind. App. 63, 40 N.E. (2d)
373 (1942), holds that an adverse ruling on an application
for a change of venue may be challenged by a motion for a
new trial, and therefore cannot be challenged by a separate
assignment of error.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kuhlenschmidt 218 Ind. 404,
33 N.E. (2d)- 340, 135 A. L. R. 397 (1941), holds that where
multiple (including legal and equitable) but related issues
are tried at the same time a general motion for a new trial
raises questions as to the separate issues.
Heekin Can Co. v. Porter 221 Ind. 69, 46 N.E. (2d) 486
(1942), holds that in a case not tried by jury a motion for a
new trial attacking the "verdict" rather than the "decision"
or "finding" is sufficient (overruling previous cases.)
Bartley v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Ry. Co. 220 Ind.
354, 41 N.E. (2d) 805 (1942), repeats and follows the rule
that error cannot be assigned on sustaining a motion to direct
a verdict as the error is in directing the verdict. (Semble as
to the overruling such a motion-the error is in refusing to
direct.)
(Note: The court concedes in this and other cases that an
attack on the verdict by motion for a new trial because it is
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not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law
raises the desired question.)
Holds also that action directing a verdict may only be
shown by a bill of exceptions. This is now repudiated by
Rule 1-7.
Note that the holding that an adverse ruling must be
followed by an exception is now repudiated by Rule 1-6.
Waltermire v. State - Ind. - , 60 N.E. (2d) 526
(1945), holds that under Rule 1-7 (1943 Revision) error may
properly be "predicated on the overruling of a motion for a
directed verdict." (But, quaere? The language of the Rule
is: "The Court's action in directing or refusing to direct a
verdict shall be shown by order book entry. Error may be
predicated upon such ruling.")
French v. National Refining Co. 217 Ind. 121, 26 N.E.
(2d) 47 (1940), holds that where the trial court directed a
verdict and this action is not specifically assigned as error
the question is still presented for review under a motion for a
new trial attacking the verdict as being contrary to law.
Kimmiek v. Linn 217 Ind. 485, 29 N.E. (2d) 207 (1940),
holds that error assigned as to a ruling on the evidence is in-
-sufficient unless the motion for a new trial sets out the
question and answer, if any, or their substance, and the ob-
jection made and the ruling.
Greek v. Seward 222 Ind. 211, 51 N.E. (2d) 3 (1943).
Acc.
Henschen v. N. Y. Central R. Co. - Ind. - , 60 N.E.
(2d) 738 (1945), holds that a motion for a new trial on the
ground that a verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence
and is contrary to law, and that the damages are insufficient,
raises no question as to damages, but that an assignment
substantially in the language of Sec. 2-2406, Burns Stat.
Supp. (Ch. 68, Sec. 2, Acts 1937, p. 333) raises the question.
(Presumably this statute repeals Sec. 2-2402, Burns Stat.
unless punitive damages are involved.)
Holds that a verdict of $1,000 in a wrongful death case,
under the facts of the case, was not inadequate to the extent
that the Supreme Court should order a new trial.
McKee v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. 222 Ind. 10, 51
N.E. (2d) 476 (1943), holds (in accord with a number of
other cases) that if a verdict or decision is against the party
having the burden of proof a motion for a new trial on the
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ground that the verdict. or decision is not sustained by suffici-
ent evidence raises no question. It is conceded that an assign-
ment that the verdict or decision is contrary to law raises the
desired question.
Warren Co. Inc. v. Exodus 114 Ind. App. 651, 54 N.E.
(2d) 775 (1944). Acc.
Rowe v. Johnson et al - Ind. -, 60 N.E. (2d) 529
(1945). Acc.
Southern Ry. Co. of Indiana et al v. Ingle Ind. App.
(1944), holds that on. a motion for a new trial for mis-
conduct of the jury in rendering a quotient verdict the fact
may not be proved by the affidavit of one whose source of
information was from one of the jurors, as a juror-may not
directly or indirectly impeach a verdict.
Venire de novo.
Burkhart et al v. Simms - Ind. App. -, 60 N.E.
(2d) 141 (1945), holds that a motion for a venire de novo
filed after final judgment presents no question.
Motion to modify.
Blagetz v. Blagetz 109 Ind. App. 662, 37 N.E. (2d) 318
(1941), holds that a motion to modify a judgment is properly
overruled where the judgment follows the findings.
Writ of error coram nobis.
State ex rel. Cutsinger v. Spencer, Judge 219 Ind. 148,
41 N.E. (2d) 60.1 (1941), holds that if after conviction the
defendant :files a petition for a writ of error coram nobis he
is -not entitled to a transcript of the record at public expense,
as~the action is.not an.appeal from or review of the judgment,
hut in effect a. motion for a new trial.
State v. Richardson - Ind. -, 63 N.E. (2d) 195
(1945), holds that a defendant-had sustained an application
for a writ of error coram nobis by alleging and proving that
his conviction was based upon an unauthorized plea of guilty
made by his attorney.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.
(2d) 399 (1940), holds that under the Indiana Constitution
the Supreme Court may not be deprived of final jurisdiction
in all appeals. The Court overrules a previous case sustaining
[Vol. 21
PROCEDURE AND PROPERTY
a statute giving the Appellate Court final jurisdiction in
appeals from the Industrial Board. The Court states that the
$50 statute is invalid but has in effect been accepted as a
Rule of Court. Sustains a petition to transfer as a writ of
error. See comment in 16 Ind. L. J. 397.
Beamer, Attorney General v. Waddell 221 Ind. 232, 279,
45 N.E. (2d) 1020, 47 N.E. (2d) 608 (1942), holds that the
Supreme Court has power to discipline any member of the
bar of the state, the statutes giving a similar power to the
trial courts not being exclusive.
(Following this case the Supreme Court promulgated
Rules 3-22 to 3-26.)
In Re Lane - Ind. - , 57 N.E. (2d) 773 (1944). In
this case, brought under Rule 3-22, the defendant is disbarred.
In Re Hardy 217 Ind. 159, 26 N.E. (2d) 921 (1940),
holds that in disbarment proceedings in the Supreme Court
an attorney may make proof of his good character and stand-
ing.
Zimmerman et at v. Zumpee et aZ 218 Ind. 476, 33 N.E.
(2d) 102 (1941), holds that if Supreme Court has no juris-
diction of an appeal the assigning of cross-errors does not
waive the question, or confer jurisdiction.
Jones v. Dowd, Warden 219 Ind. 114, 37 N.E. (2d) 68
(1941), holds that Supreme Court has no "original" juris-
diction of an action for habeas corpus.
Hawkins v. Wheat et at - Ind. - , 59 N.E. (2d)
728 (1945), holds that the statute requiring transfer of an
appeal filed in the wrong court does not apply to an "original"
action and therefore an action for mandate filed in the
Supreme Court which should have been filed in the Appellate
Court must be dismissed.
Montgomery v. State 222 Ind. 607, 56 N.E. (2d) 854
(1944), holds that the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to
decide whether or not a statute limiting the extent of the
review on appeal from the juvenile court is constitutional.
Montgomery v. State - Ind. App. - , 57 N.E. (2d)
943 (1944), holds that the Appellate Court has power to
determine its own constitutional jurisdiction and that a
statute limiting appellate review in an appeal from a juvenile
court is unconstitutional.
State ex rel. Seaton v. Industrial Board 222 Ind. 526, 54
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N.E. (2d) 944 (1944), holds that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to prohibit the Industrial Board.
State ex rel. Miller v. Appellate Court 220 Ind. 538, 45
N.E. (2d) 206 (1942), holds that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to mandate or prohibit the Appellate Court, as
its statutory authority on the subject is limited to trial courts.
State ex rel. Guckenberger et al v. Franklin Circuit Court
108 Ind. App. 428, 29 N.E. (2d) 423 (1940), holds that the
Appellate Court may prohibit the prosecution of another
action involving the subject-matter of an appeal pending in
that Court.
State ex rel. Dawson, Lt. Governor et al v. Marion Cir-
cuit Court et al 218 Ind. 451, 33 N.E. (2d) 515, 582 (1941),
holds that the Supreme Court may not issue a writ of prohibi-
tion against a trial court unless there is no jurisdiction in the
strict sense. (I.e. a trial court has jurisdiction in the field of
injunction against state officers and if an injunction is
erroneously granted the remedy is by appeal.)
State ex rel. Kist v. Randolph Circuit Court 218 Ind. 40,
29 N.E. (2d) 989 (1940), holds that the writ of prohibition
will not issue on the fear that a court will not respect a plea
of res judicata, as the remedy is by appeal, the court having
jurisdiction to decide such an issue.
(See also, accord, as between the federal and state courts,
Toucey v. New York Life (1941) 314 U.S. 118, 582, 585, 62
Sup. Ct. 139, 86 L. Ed. 100, 472.
State ex rel. Emmert, Attorney General et al v. Hamilton
Circuit Court - Ind. - , 61 N.E. (2d) 182 (1945), holds
that a trial court has jurisdiction of a writ of error coram
nobis and the possibility of its wrongful issuance is not ground
for prohibition.
The Supreme Court promulgates Rule 2-40 permitting an
appeal from a ruling either way on a writ of error coram
nobis to be governed by the rules applicable to appeals from
interlocutory order, even although the writ is denied. See
Note on this case, 20 Ind. L. J. 334 (July, 1945.)
Rules 2-35 to 2-39, 1943 Revision, provide for the first
time express rules governing the procedure for actions of
mandate and prohibition in the Supreme Court (and pre-
sumably the Appellate Court?)
First Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Crawley 221
Ind. 682, 50 N.E. (2d) 918 (1943), holds that under the facts
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presented a writ of certiorari seeking a review of a decision
by the Appellate Court should be dismissed. The Court leaves
open the question as to whether or not the writ might be an
available remedy where an appeal would be held to be an in-
adequate remedy, or no appeal was. available.
Written Opinions.
State ex rel. Dowd, Warden v. Superior Court of LaPorte
Co., etc. 219 Ind. 17, 36 N.E. (2d) 765 (1941), holds that a
written opinion is required in original actions.
City of Indianapolis v. Butzke 217 Ind. 203, 26 N.E. (2d)
754 (1940), holds that the constitutional requirement as to
the writing of an opinion by the Supreme Court does not
apply to questions as to the compliance with the Rules on
briefing.
Appealable Orders and Judgments.
Thomas v. Kelly - Ind. App. - , 58 N.E. (2d) 942
(1945), holds, following a long line of cases, that a judgment
vacating a prior judgment is not a final judgment for the
purpose of appeal.
Pisarski v. Glowiszyn 220 Ind. 128, 41 N.E. (2d) 358
(1941), holds that a final order in proceedings supplemental
to execution is not an interlocutory order and that jurisdiction
of an appeal therefrom is in the Appellate Court.
Thomas v. O'Connell's Estate 111 Ind. App. 423, 41 N.E.
(2d) 656 (1941), holds that after a ruling sustaining a de-
murrer to a complaint there is no appealable judgment until
the trial court enters a formal judgment against the plaintiff.
(Under Rule 2-3, 1943 Revision, the Appellate or Supreme
Court now has power to stay dismissal of an appeal in this
type of case and permit the appellant to take care of the
difficulty.)
Greathouse v. MeKinney 220 Ind. 462, 44 N.E. (2d) 344
(1942), holds that an order annulling final approval of an
administrator's final report and ordering an amended report
is not a final judgment.
Poston v. Akin et al 218 Ind. 142, 31 N.E. (2d) 638
(1941), holds that a ruling refusing to remove a receiver is
not such an interlocutory order as is appealable.
Parfenoff et al v. Kozlowski et al 218 Ind. 154, 31 N.E.
(2d) 206 (1941). Acc. Poston v. Akin, above, holding further
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that there is no appeal from the appointment of a substitute
receiver.
Time for Appeal; Bonds.
Reasor v. Reasor - Ind. App. - , 60 N.E. (2d) 536
(1945), holds that the delivery of a transcript of the record to
the post office for mailing is not a filing in the office of the
clerk, and if delivered to the clerk after the time for appeal
has expired the appeal must be dismissed.
Wimberg, Admx. v. Kroemer 108 Ind. App. 65, 27 N.E.
(2d) 115. (1939), holds that under Rule 1 (1937 Revision)
trial court no longer had any power to extend the time for
taking appeal as the Rule allowed only 90 days. (Rule 2-2 now
provides that an extension may be granted by the court to
which the appeal is sought.)
Anderson v. Lagow 220 Ind. 363, 41 N.E. (2d) 798
(1942), holds that Rule 2-2, 1940 Revision, did not supersede
the statute requiring an appeal to be perfected within sixty
days after the filing of an appeal bond.
(Note: Does the 1943 Revision change this result?
Caution requires that the above case be respected.)
Zimmerman v. Zumpee 218 Ind. 476, 33 N.E. (2d) 102
(1941), holds that the pendency of a motion to modify the
judgment, or in arrest of judgment, does not toll the time for
taking appeal.
City of Michigan City v. Williamson 217 Ind. 598, 28
N.E. (2d) 961 (1940), holds that the pendency of a motion
to modify a judgment does not toll the time for taking an
appeal.
Barr v. Allen 217 Ind. 489, 29 N.E. (2d) 316 (1940),
holds that statute allowing 30 days for appeal in flood con-
trol proceedings was not repudiated by the Supreme Court
Rules of 1937 and 1940. (The 1943 Revision allows 90 days
"unless the statute under which the appeal or review is taken
fixes a shorter time." Rule 2-2.)
Smith v. Zumpfe 217 Ind. 431, 27 N.E. (2d) 878 (1940),
holds that if an order for the sale of real estate in a receiver-
ship proceeding in which the court made the sale is contingent
on its approval the order is interlocutory and not final. Ap-
peal not perfected within 30 days dismissed.
Western & So. Life Ins. Co. v. Lottes - Ind. App.
, 63 N.E. (2d) 146 (1945), holds that under Rule 2-3
(1943 Revision) it is unnecessary to filq an appeal bond, and
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therefore failure to file a bond in conformity with an allow-
ance of time in the trial court does not require a dismissal.
(Quaere? Does the new Rule supersede the statutes previously
construed as making the filing of an appeal bond a juris-
dictional prerequisite, as, e.g., in appeals from interlocutory
orders, or was it intended simply to permit the filing at any
time before the appeal is perfected and after term, without
any allowance of time?)
Weber v. Fohl 111 Ind. App. 388, 41 N.E. (2d) 648
(1941), holds that a trial court may (by statute) accept a
certified check as an appeal bond.
Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. Scott Const. Co. 217
Ind. 408, 27 N.E. (2d) 879 (1940), holds that an assignment
of cross-errors must be filed within the time allowed for an
appeal. (This rule is changed by Rule 2-6, and an appellee
is now permitted to assign cross-errors within 30 days after
the filing of the appellant's brief.)
Assignment of Errors; Parties.
Carr v. Schneider's Estate 114 Ind. App. 149, 51 N.E.
(2d) 392 (1943), holds that a decedent's estate is not a legal
person and an assignment of errors which names an estate
as appellee does not designate an appellee and the appeal is
dismissed.
(-But, quaere? If the administrator or executor defended
the action in the trial court without raising the question, is
it not only a misnomer which was waived?)
Rogowski v. Kaelin 111 Ind. App. 535, 41 N.E. (2d) 954
(1942). Appeal is dismissed for failure to name co-defend-
ants in the assignment of errors. (Under Rule 2-6, 1943
Revision, the Court may now permit the appellant to cure the
defect by amendment.)
State ex rel. Scher v. Ayres 217 Ind. 179, 26 N.E. (2d)
1002 (1940), holds that the caption and body of an assign-
ment of errors are construed together in determining who
the parties on appeal are and the capacity in which they have
been made parties.
State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, v. Viets, v. Krack 217 Ind.
348, 28 N.E. (2d) 256 (1940), holds that a joint assignment
of error as to several conclusions of law is bad if any one
conclusion is correct. (Rule 2-6 literally construed does not
change this result, as it relates only to the situation where two
or more parties join. Cf. Rule 1-6.)
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Holds further, in accord with a long line of cases (and
the 1943 Revision does not change the law) that, 1. a motion
for a new trial can not challenge conclusions of law, and the
error must be separately assigned in the assignment of error;
2. a motion for a new trial challenging the "judgment" as
being contrary to law, etc., raises no question (the verdict,
decision or findings must be challenged, not the judgment) ;
3. conclusions of law included in special findings, and con-
versely, are disregarded; 4. a failure to find a material fact is
a finding on the fact against the party having the burden of
proof. (cf. Rule 1-8. The defect could have been amended. Is
it deemed amended on appeal under Sec. 2-3231, Burns Stat.?)
Gardner v. Lohmann Constr. Co. - Ind. App. -, 62
N.E. (2d) 867 (1945), holds that the Employment Security
Act of .1943, which provides for a review in the Superior
Court of Marion County of orders and decisions of the Em-
ployment Security Division, and an appeal from the Court to
the Appellate Court is valid; that the proceedings in the
Superior Court are not a trial, and therefore a motion for a
new trial raises no question, and its overruling cannot be
assigned as error on appeal.
Tyler v. State - Ind. App. -, 63 N.E. (2d) 145
(1945), holds that in an appeal from the juvenile court the
only proper assignment of error is that "the decision of the
court is contrary to law."
Koss v. Continental Oil Co. 222 Ind. 224, 52 N.E. (2d)
614 (1943), holds that in an appeal from the denial of a
motion for a temporary injunction an assignment that the
court erred in denying the injunction presents all questions
as the validity of the court's action.
Pisarski v. Glowiszyn 220 Ind. 128, 41 N.E. (2d) 358
(1941), holds that a motion for a new trial is not necessary
to preserve an effective appeal from an interlocutory order.
Carson, Receiver v. Perkins 217 Ind. 543, 29 N.E. (2d)
7'72 (1940), holds that an adverse ruling on a motion for
change of venue must be assigned as grounds for new trial,
and cannot be separately assigned in the assignment of error.
Long v. Archer 221 Ind. 186, 46 N.E. (2d) 818 (1942),
holds that a party may only preserve a question on a motion
to direct a verdict by tendering a written peremptory in-
struction. (This is repudiated by Rule 1-7, 1943 Revision.)
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Record on Appeal.
Smith v. American Creosoting Co. 221 Ind. 613, 50 N.E.
(2d) 619 (1943), holds that under Rule 2-3, 1943 Revision,
no extension of time for filing bills of exception by the trial
court is now necessary and a bill filed any time before the
appeal is perfected is properly in the record. Cf. Kubisz v.
Pomorski (1943) 221 Ind. 655, 51 N.E. (2d) 82, decided
under the old law.
Michigan City News Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury et al
Ind. App. -, 61 N.E. (2d) 470 (1945), holds that under
Rules 2-2, 2-3 (1943 Revision) a bill of exceptions may be
filed within 90 days, although the court allowed only .30 days.
Tinkham v. Tinkham 112 Ind. App. 532, 45 N.E. (2d)
357 (1942), holds that a bill of exceptions is not properly in
the record unless signed by the judge and the fact of filing
is shown by the certificate of the clerk or an order book entry.
Holds further that an amended certificate may not be filed
after the time for perfecting an appeal has expired.
(Rule 2-3, 1943 Revision provides that the filing of a
bill of exceptions may be evidenced by an order book entry
or the clerk's certificate. The Rules do not fix a time for, the
correction of the record (Rule 2-28). The language is similar
to that of previous Rules, and the principal case is in accord
with previous cases. What was sought, however, was an
amendment to and not a correction of the record. It is sug-
gested that the judge did file the bill when he delivered it to
the clerk and had the appellant by motion for a nune pro tune
entry obtained an order book entry the order could have been
incorporated in to the record under Rule 2-28. See, N.O.
Nelson Mfg. Corp. v. Dickson (1943) 114 Ind. App. 229, 51
N.E. (2d) 895, holding that this procedure is proper.)
Keeshin Motor Express Co. Inc. et al v. Glassman 219
Ind. 538, 38 N.E. (2d) 847 (1942), holds that a bill of ex-
ceptions is validated only by the signature of the judge, and
not by the signature of the clerk or reporter.
(There is nothing in the new Rules changing this result.)
Kist et al v. Coughtin et al Ind. -, 57 N.E. (2d)
199 (1944), holds that if the judge's certificate to a bill of
exception containing the evidence does not contain an express
statement that all of the evidence is included but the record
otherwise discloses that the bill is complete the fact may be
thus established.
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Levy v. Winget - Ind. App. - , 57 N.E. (2d) 629
(1944), holds that Rule 2-3 permits proof of the filing of a
bill of exceptions either by order book entry or the certificate
of the clerk, but in the absence of either form of proof a bill
cannot be considered a part of the record on appeal.
Cook v. State of Indiana 219 Ind. 234, 37 N.E. (2d) 63
(1941), holds that if the fact that the record entries are in-
complete or inaccurate is indicated by some memorandum (in
this case the court's minute book) the proof of what a correct
record would be may be by parol. (Indianapolis Life Ins. Co.
v. Lundquist (1943) 222 Ind. 359, 53 N.E. (2d) 338, acc.)
Conner v. Jones - Ind. App. - , 54 N.E. (2d) 283
59 N.E. (2d) 577, 60 N.E. (2d) 534 (1945), holds that it is
presumed on appeal the trial court in ruling on a motion for
a new trial performed its duty and weighed the evidence, and
the contrary may not be proved by the attempted inclusion
in the record by a bill of exceptions of a letter written by the
judge to the attorneys in explanation of his ruling.
Hosel v. Cain; Kahler v. Cain 222 Ind. 330, 53 N.E. (2d)
769 (1944), holds that under the 1940 Revision an original
bill of exceptions containing oral objections to the instruction
may be included in the record. (Rule 2-3, 1943 Revision,
expressly provides that an original bill may be used without
copying.)
Department of Financial Institutions v. Neumann 217
Ind. 85, 26 N.E. (2d) 388 (1940), holds that original docu-
ments introduced in evidence may be included in a bill of
exceptions.
Soucie v. State of Indiana 218 Ind. 215, 31 N.E. (2d)
1018 (1941), holds that where a motion for new trial raises an
issue of fact not proved by the record (i.e. newly discovered
evidence) no question is presented unless the record contains
a bil of exceptions on the hearing on that issue.
(The practice here contemplates a formal hearing, and
the party should introduce in evidence the affidavits support-
ing the motion. The adverse part may dispute this evidence
and the court may hear oral evidence. See, Hauk v. Allen
(1890) 126 Ind. 568, 25 N.E. 879.)
Gerking v. Johnson 220 Ind. 501, 44 N.E. (2d) 90 (1942).
Acc. above case as to necessity of bill of exceptions as to the
hearing on a motion for a new trial.
Messersmith v. State of Indiana 217 Ind. 132, 26 N.E.
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(2d) 908 (1940), holds that a bill of exceptions containing
only part of the evidence does not support a review as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment.
Briefs, Their Filing and Service.
James C. Curtis & Co. v. Emmerling et al 218 Ind. 172,
31 N.E. (2d) 986 (1941), holds that service of appellant's
brief after the time allowed for filing the brief requires dis-
missal of appeal.
Elliott et al v. Gardner 113 Ind, App. 47, 46 N.E. (2d)
702 (1943), holds that briefs left in the clerk's office after
office hours though the aid of the janitor were properly filed.
Indiana Service Corporation et al v. Town of Flora 218
Ind. 208, 31 N.E. (2d) 1015 (1941), holds that an appeal from
the overruling of defendant's objections in eminent domain
proceedings under Sec. 2-3218, Burns Stat. is not from an
interlocutory order and time for filing briefs is not governed
by the rules on interlocutory appeals.
Gary Rwys. Co. v. Kleinknight 110 Ind. App. 72, 36 N.E.
(2d) 939 (1941), holds that the mailing of a copy of appel-
ant's brief on the last day for filing, where the brief is not
received by the appellee until after the time for filing, does
not comply with Rule 2-19, whicll requires the filing of proof
of service at the time of filing.
Wright v. Hines - Ind. App. -, 62 N.E. (2d) 884
(1945).
Ace. above case.
Judicial Notice.
Board of Com'rs of Allen County et at v. Gable et at
Ind. App. -, 57 N.E. (2d) 69 (1944), holds that the
Appellate Court- does not take judicial notice of the records
of the Industrial Board, and therefore a judgment against an
insurance carrier must be reversed where there is no evidence
as to its liability and the Board did not expressly find that
according to its records it had insured the employer.
Zimmerman v. Zumpee 218 Ind. 476, 33 N.E. (2d) 102
(1941), holds that the Supreme Court may take judicial notice
of the record in a former appeal in the same case.
Decision on the Merits.
Cooper et at v. Tarpley et at 112 Ind. App. 1, 41 N.E.
(2d) 640 (1942), holds that if a fact omitted from special
findings was established by undisputed evidence the findings
will be deemed amended to include that fact.
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Petition to Transfer.
Long et al v. Van Osdale et al 218 Ind. 483, 29 N.E. (2d)
953 (1940), holds that if a petitioner represents that the
Appellate Court opinion does not fully and fairly state the
record a petition to transfer is granted.
(Rule 2-23, 1943 Revision, states the substance of this
decision.)
Smith v. Am. Creosoting Co. 221 Ind. 613, 50 N.E. (2d)
619 (1943), holds that the Supreme Court may review a
decision of the Appellate Court under Rule 2-2 denying an
extension of time for perfecting an appeal.
L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks 219 Ind. 348, 38 N.E. (2d)
577 (1942), holds that if four judges of the Appellate Court
fail to agree on a petition for a rehearing there is no authority
for a transfer to the Supreme Court, as the pertinent statute
applies only as to the original decision of the case by- the
Appellate Court.
Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn 219 Ind. 350,
38 N. E. (2d) 569 (1942). Applies the result of Ayres & Co.
v. Hicks, above, to an "appeal" from the Industrial Board.
(This is on the theory that the Board not being a Court the
"appeal" is a review; jurisdiction is placed in the Appellate
Court and therefore until that court decides the case there
is nothing to transfer.) But, quaere? See, Gavit, Pleading
& Practice, Sec. 502.
Fardy v. Mayerstein 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E. (2d) 966
(1942), holds that the denial of a petition to transfer is not
an approval of the language of the Appellate Court decision.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Fraudulent Conveyances.
Bellin v. Bloom 217 Ind. 656, 28 N.E. (2d) 53 (1940),
holds (overruling some previous cases) that where an owner
of real estate conveys in fraud of creditors and the grantee
orally agrees to reconvey there is no constructive trust which
the grantor can enforce.
Exemptions.
Tomlinson et al v. Miller et al - Ind. App. - , 58
N.E. (2d) 358 (1944), holds that the conveyance of property
exempt from execution creates in the grantee an estate free
from the lien or enforcement of a judgment against the
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grantor.
Clay v. Hamilton - Ind. App. -, 63 N.E. (2d) 207
(1945), holds that a judgment for alimony is not a contract
judgment and the judgment debtor is not entitled to an ex-
emption.
Proceedings Supplemental to Execution.
Ettinger v. Robbins et al - Ind. - , 59 N.E. (2d)
118 (1945), holds that the general statutes on service of
process are applicable to proceedings supplemental to execu-
tion, and service on a defendant at his residence is therefore
proper.
Mitchell v. Godsey, Adm'x 222 Ind. 527, 53 N.E. (2d)
150 (1944), holds that proceedings supplemental to execution
may be filed in the original cause, and a formal complaint is
not necessary; the trial court may take judicial notice of the
records, including the writ of execution, in the original case;
and it may declare a lien oil the defendant's salary although
the employer is not a party, and order the defendant to make
specified payments out of his salary.
Property Subject to Exemptions.
First National Bank of Goodland v. Pothuisje 217 Ind.
1, 25 N.E. (2d) 436, 130 A. L. R. 1238 (1940), holds that the
separate bankruptcies of a husband and wife do not prevent
the enforcement of a joint liability against them out of
property owned by them as tenants by the entireties. Cf.
Shabaz v. Lazar (1945) - Ind. App.- , 60 N.E. (2d)
748, holding that if the property is subsequently acquired and
the result of the husband's earnings the above case does not
apply.
Execution.
Williams et ux v. Lyddick - Ind. App. -, 61 N.E.
(2d) 186 (1945), holds that in the situation presented by the
Pothuisje case the judgment creditor is not entitled to the
issuance of a general writ of execution, as it may be levied on
separate property not subject to exemption because of the
discharges in bankruptcy.
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PROPERTY
REAL PROPERTY
Deeds.
Leroy v. Wood 113 Ind. App. 397, 47 N.E. (2d) 604
(1943), holdg that a deed to a person in an assumed or ficti-
tious name is valid.
(This is in keeping with the general rule that, in the
absence of fraud, one's name is what he chooses, even for a
specific transaction. There is no law against one changing
his name as often as he chooses. The statutes on the subject
of change of name by court action simply provide a method
of securing a record on the matter.)
Easements.
N.Y. Central Rd. Co. v. Yarian 219 Ind. 477, 39 N.E.
(2d) 604, 139 A. L. R. 455 (1942). Deals with the law of
easements by necessity, and the extent of the easement. The
opinion contains an excellent statement and discussion of the
law on this subject.
Tenants by the Entireties.
French v. National Refining Co. 217 Ind. 121, 26 N.E.
(2d) 47 (1940), holds that where husband and wife, owning
real estate as tenants by the entireties entered into a lease,
such a lease could not be cancelled by the husband alone. The
facts were held not to conclude the wife on the grounds of
estoppel.
Ch. 234, Acts 1943, p. 667, Sec. 56-901, 2, Burns Stat.,
extends the law of survivorship to contracts of purchase of
real estate where the purchasers are husband and wife, unless
a different intent is expressed, and provides that in the event
of divorce they shall own "equal shares."
(Is it a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entireties? May
they sell separately during their lives, and does the survivor-
ship operate to the prejudice of the creditors of the decedent?
Ch. 30, Acts 1945, p. 51, amends the above statute to provide
that they own the contract as tenants by the entireties.)
Partition.
Myers et al v. Brane - Ind. App. - , 57 N.E. (2d)
594 (1944), holds that where one co-tenant acquires an in-
terest in real estate from the owner during his life-time,
without restriction as to sale or partition, such a co-tenant is
[Vol. 21
PROCEDURE AND PROPERTY
not bound by a restrictive devise to others, and can compel
partition.
Estates and Future Interests. (See also, Wills)
Chapter 216, Acts 1945, p. 983, repeals the previous
statutes on the "Rule against Perpetuties." The bill was pre-
pared by a committee of the State Bar Association and ap-
proved and sponsored by that organization. It revives the
Common Law Rule and thus permits the creation of future
contingent interests if they will vest within lives in being plus
21 years. It deals in detail with the law of accumulations.
Undoubtedly it has the effect of placing the law on express
restraints on alienation on its common law basis. In general
this permitted restraints if under the circumstances they were
reasonable.
(It is suggested that a draftsman may solve any problem
as to remote vesting by including in a will or deed creating
future contingent interests the following clause: "Each and
every contingent future interest created by this instrument
is subject to the following further limitation and condition;
the condition or limitation upon which its vesting depends
must happen or be satisfied within the lives of a, b, c, d, e,
etc., plus 21 years after the death of the last to survive."
It is very well settled that the lives designated need not
be those of parties interested in the property and by select-
ing a group of ascertainable younger persons one can insure
a very substantial time for the vesting of the interests in-
volved. The above clause, of course, need not be used where
the gift is from one charity to another as in that situation
the rule against remote vesting does not apply.)
Alig, Exec. v. Levey, Trustee 219 Ind. 618, 39 N.E. (2d)
137 (1942), holds that income received during the administra-
tion of a decedent's estate is income belonging to a life tenant
of the trust established and is not corpus belonging to the
remaindermen.
Rouse v. Paidrick 221 Ind. 517, 49 N.E. (2d) 528 (1943),
holds that a contingent remainder may not be destroyed by
merger.,
(This is a far-reaching decision as it is based on the
proposition that the law of seisin is a dead letter. Logically
it follows that the repudiation of a life estate does not destroy
a contingent remainder, and that in any event it can always
take effect as an executory interest, unless as a matter of
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interpretation it is held that a contingent remainder, with
all of its common law incidents, was intended. A careful
draftsman can settle the question by expressly providing that
a contingent remainder is not intended.)
Lefler et at v. Hoffman et at 112 Ind. App. 387, 44 N.E.
(2d) 1022 (1942), holds that where a testator created a trust
for the support of his nephew, the property to be distributed
to his children upon his death, the nephew's renunciation of
the gift did not accelerate the remainder.
Scobey v. Beckman 111 Ind. App. 574, 41 N.E. (2d) 847
(1942). The testatrix made a present gift to a church of her
home property to be used as a parsonage, on condition that a
memorial plate be placed and maintained on the property.
The property was sold to pay debts and the question was
whether the balance remaining after debts were paid belonged
to the church or the residuary legatee. The court states that
the Rule against Perpetuties does not apply to a charitable
gift (but it never applies to I present gift of any character.)
The church's interest was described as a "determinable" or
"qualified" fee, and the court refers to the condition both as a
conditional limitation and a condition subsequent. (Strictly,
a determinable fee is on a conditional limitation and not a
condition subsequent.) On the only point in issue the court
held that the church was entitled to the proceeds of the sale,
the condition as to use and the condition subsequent as to the
plate having become impossible of performance.
Trusts.
Lehman et at v. Pierce et at 109 Ind. App. 497, 36 N.E.
(2d) 952 (1941), holds that an unenforceable parol trust
becomes enforceable if the grantee later executes a written
agreement to be bound by the original agreement.
Clay v. Hamilton - Ind. App. -, 63 N.E. (2d) 207
(1945), holds that the accruing income of a spendthrift trust
can be reached in proceedings supplemental to execution to
satisfy a judgment for alimony.
Quinn et at v. Peoples Trust & Savings Co. et at - Ind.
-, 60 N.E. (2d) 281 (1945), holds that a will creating a
trust for the education of a limited class of persons is a
charitable trust; that specific language which limited the
trust to one beneficiary at a time, in the light of the entire
will, was not so intended, and that under the will in question
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there.was an intention to devote all of the property in question
to an educational trust.
Ebenezer's Old People's Home of Evangelical Assn. of
Ebenezer, New York et al v. South Bend Old People's Home,
Inc. et al 113 Ind. App. 382, 48 N.E. (2d) 851 (1943), holds
that a gift to a charitable corporation is not a charitable trust.
(This is good law and straightens out a common confusion
arising out of the assumption that every gift to a charitable
corporation creates a charitable trust. But it is the law of
corporations which imposes on its officers the duty to use the
property for charitable purposes, and there is no trust.)
City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. American Nat'l Bank
217 Ind. 305, 27 N.E. (2d) 764 (1940), deals with the right
of the beneficiaries of a, trust to charge the trust estate with
attorney's fees incurred in an action brought to preserve the
trust estate. Held, under thd facts, that recovery should not
be allowed.
Bray et al v. Old Natlt Bank in Evansville et al 113 Ind.
App. 506, 48 N.E. (2d) 846 (1943), holds that unless it is
clear that the settlor imposed personal confidence in his
trustee powers granted to the trustee pass to his successor.
Robison et at v. Elston Bank & Tr. Co. et al 113 Ind. App.
633, 48 N.E. (2d) 181 (1943), recognizes that an ex parte
order in the administration of a trust estate is not binding on
the beneficiaries.
Personal Property; Fixtures.
Michael v. Holland 111 Ind. App. 34, 40 N.E. (2d) 362
(1942), holds that proof that a creditor orally forgave part
of an indebtedness does not prove a gift, for lack of delivery.
Calwell et al v. Bankers Tr. Co. 113 Ind. App. 345, 47
N.E. (2d) 170 (1943), holds that where a lease gave the
landlord an option to purchase a new boiler installed by the
tenant, and the tenant a privilege to remove if the option was
not exercised, the agreement continued binding on the parties
where at the termination of the lease the lease was renewed
from month to month.
Home Oiners' Loan Corp. v. Eyanson et al 113 Ind. App.
52, 46 N.E. (2d) 711 (1943), holds that a conditional sales
vendor (who did not record) may remove a furnace as
against a prior mortgagee who had foreclosed and purchased
at foreclosure sale, as the conditional sales act protects only
subsequent purchasers, if the contract is not recorded. It was
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also held that removal without substantial injury means
physical injury, and not as improved by the fixture.
MORTGAGES
Thurston v. Buxton, Admtrx et al 218 Ind. 585, 34 N.E.
(2d) 549 (1941), holds that the interest of a remainderman
is subject to mortgage and such a mortgage is valid against
the creditors of his estate, including funeral and last illness
expenses.
Fletcher Avenue Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Zeller 217 Ind.
244, 27 N.E. (2d) 351, 128 A. L. R. 793 (1940), holds that
if a mortgagor, or one claiming under him, redeems from a
foreclosure sale the mortgagee may resell under the order of
sale as to any balance due on the judgment.
DESCENT
Phillips v. Townsend - Ind. - , 62 N.E. (2d) 860
(1945), holds that an illegitimate but acknowledged son does
not become the heir of the father's sister.
Hall v. Fivecoat et al 110 Ind. App. 704, 38 N.E. (2d)
905 (1942), holds that an illegitimate but acknowledged child
becomes the heir of his father, but not the heir of his father's
father.
WILLS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
Lawrence et al v. Ashba et al - Ind. App. - , 59
N.E. (2d) 568 (1945), holds that the fact that a husband and
wife have made reciprocal wills only tends to prove a con-
tract not to revoke, but the, contract may be proved by that
fact plus other admissible evidence; that the contract in
question included property owned by a surviving spouse as
tenant by the entireties.
(Note that the court assumes that the State of Frauds
was satisfied by the wills involved, plus parol evidence. Note
also that it was assumed that the revocation was effective,
and that the beneficiaries' remedy was for specific perform-
ance, or the enforcement of a constructive trust.)
Manrow et al v. Deveney et al 109 Ind. App. 264, 33 N.E.
(2d) 371 (1941), holds that a mutual will is revoked by a
later will, even although the first will was made pursuant to
a contract not to revoke, and the beneficiaries' remedies are
by claim for damages or in equity (to enforce a trust).
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Weppler et al v. Hoffine et al 218 Ind. 31, 30 N.E. (2d)
549 (1940), holds that a devise to the testator's wife for life
and a residuary devise of "all my property" to his children,
and if any die before the wife without issue, created in the
children a "determinable" fee; that the latter clause was not
substitutionary; that the estate of a child who died during
the lifetime of the widow without children was divested in
favor of the balance of the class; that the child's interest was
conveyable but the grantee took subject to the condition.
Martin et al v. Raff et al 114 Ind. App. 507, 52 N.E. (2d)
839 (1944), holds that a devise to a daughter and "if she die
without issue" then over means if she die without issue during
the testator's lifetime.
Hamilton v. Williams 111 Ind. App. 148, 37 N.E. (2d)
695 (1941), holds that where testator gave to his wife for
life, and to his nephews and nieces then living, the latter
referred to the death of the wife and not the death of the
testator and a nephew who survived the testator but not the
widow could not take. (Previous cases have erronedusly
applied the substitutionary rule to this type of will.)
Koch, Executor v. Wix 108 Ind. App. 20, 25 N.E. (2d)
277 (1939). Testator gave a legacy of $1,000 to each of his
employees who had been in his employ for ten or more years,
and $500 to each who had served from five to ten years. In
an action brought to construe the will, held, that only those
employed at the time of the testator's death were beneficiaries.
Pierce v. Farmers State Bank of Valparaiso 222 Ind. 116,
51 N.E. (2d) 480 (1943), holds that a will giving property
to an unmarried son for life, and after his death "if he shall
have married and leave surviving him children" then to the
children is unambiguous, and an adopted child of the son
could not take. Evidence was inadmissible to prove that the
father knew the son was sterile and planning to marry a
widow with one child. (99 Ind. App. 463 disapproved.)
Kaiser et al v. Happel et al 219 Ind. 28, 36 N.E. (2d) 784
(1941), holds that in an action to contest after ex parte pro-
bate the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but that in an
action resisting probate the burden of proof is on the de-
fendant.
Holds further that an instruction to the effect that a
testator is presumed to be of sound mind is erroneous.
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PROBATE
Hamilton v. Huntington et al - Ind. - , 58 N.E. (2d)
349, 59 N.E. (2d) 122 (1944), holds that Sec. 6-308, Burns
Stat. providing for the appointment of a special administrator
pending the contest of a will applies only where objections
have been filed and probate prevented, and does not apply
where the will has been probated ex parte, an executor ap-
pointed, and a will contest action begun. Disapproves In re
Barger's Est. 114 Ind. App. 129, 51 N.E. (2d) 104 (1943).
Pettibone et al v. Moore - Ind. -, 59 N.E. (2d)
114 (1945). Superseding (Ind. App.) 57 N.E. (2d) 65, and
holding that if a general administrator closes an estate with-
out prosecuting an action for wrongful death a special admin-
istrator may be appointed for that purpose.
(N.B. In this case the defendant in the action for wrong-
ful death went into the probate court and moved to vacate the
appointment. The law is well settled that the question of the
validity of the appointment of an administrator cannot be
litigated in a collateral proceeding; the question must be raised
in the probate court making the appointment.)
Tinkham v. Tinkham 112 Ind. App. 532, 45 N.E. (2d)
357 (1942), holds that where money jointly owned was de-
posited in the joint name of husband and wife the surviving
wife might recover her share in an action brought against the
bank and the executor of the husband's estate, as the executor
had not acquired possession of the property involved.
(Is not the decision questionable? If it was the husband's
property title passes to the executor by operation of law, and
whether he makes his claim against the bank prior or sub-
sequent to an action brought by the claimant is immaterial.
Cf. Isbell v. Heiny (1941) 218 Ind. 579, 33 N.E. (2d) 106;
Williams v. Williams (1940) 217 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. (2d) 557.)
Isbell v. Heiny, Admr. 218 Ind. 579, 33 N.E. (2d) 106
(1941), holds that an action against an administrator to
replevin property which the latter claims as assets of the
estate may not be maintained; the claimant must proceed in
the probate court.
Williams v. Williams, Admr. 217 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. (2d)
557 (1940), holds that the statute creating a limited liability
against the estate of a decedent for his tortious conduct, and
Sec. 2-6001, Burns Stat. require that the claim be filed in the
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probate proceedings, and a separate action against the ad-
ministrator is prohibited.
Sense v. Roach 222 Ind. 323, 53 N.E. (2d) 784 (1944),
holds that a claim filed more than six months after notice and
after a final report has been filed is too late, and the fact
that the administrator knew of the claim is immaterial.
Coats v. Veedersburg State Bank et at 219 Ind. 675, 38
N.E. (2d) 243 (1941), holds that where the administrator
does not within the first year file an action, to sell real estate
to pay debts a judgment creditor may then proceed to sell the
property on execution.
Lockridge et al v. Citizens Trust Co. of Greencastle et aZ
110 Ind. App. 253, 37 N.E. (2d) 728 (1941). Contains an
excellent discussion of the right to rent as between an
executor, or trustee and the heirs.
In re Stahl's Estate First Nat. Bk & Tr. Co. of LaPorte et at
v. Smith et at 113 Ind. App. 29, 44 N.E. (2d) 529 (1942),
holds that where a testator appoints as executor A, and if A
resigns, B, on A's resignation the probate court must appoint
B unless he is ineligible; that a probate court or a testator
may not control an executor's employment of legal counsel.
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